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Linguistic Divisions and the Language 
Charter - The Case of Moldova 
Moldova is deeply divided along language lines. The principal polarization is 
found in the gulf between the speakers of Russian and of the state language, 
Romanian/Moldovan. To the first category belong not only Russians, but also 
national minorities such as Ukrainians, Gagauzians and Bulgarians, who tend to 
employ Russian more than the state language. The two main linguisti c groups 
inhabit two largely separate societal spheres, with different media and 
educational institutions. Meanwhile, Moldova’s ratification of the European 
Charter for Regional or Minority Languages (hereinafter the Language Charter) 1 
is still pending. While Moldova swiftly signed and ratified the Framework 
Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (FCNM), 2 it limited itself to 
signing the Language Charter in 2002 - and still had to ratify ten years later. This 
working paper analyzes the reasons behind Moldova’s linguistic divide, which 
seemingly translates into a resistance to the ratification of the Language 
Charter.3
   
Federica Prina, March 2013 
ECMI Working Paper # 64 
I. MOLDOVA: A DIVIDED 
SOCIETY 
According to the 2004 census, the last for which 
data is available, in Moldova (minus 
Transnistria) 75.81% of the population self-
identified as Moldovan, 8.35% as Ukrainian, 
5.95% as Russian, 4.36% as Gagauz, 2.17 % as 
Romanian, 1.94% as Bulgarian, and 1.32% as 
representatives of other ethnic groups.
4
 The 
Moldovan government reported in 2009 that 
75.2% of the population used as main language 
Romanian/Moldovan, 16% Russian, 3.8% 
Ukrainian, 3.1% Gazauz and 1.1% Bulgarian.
5
 
These figures tell us that those who use the state 
language as main language of communication 
(75.2% of the population) largely coincide with 
the percentage of the population that self-
identify as either Moldovan or Romanian 
(77.97%). It also follows that national minorities  
 
 
(22% of the population) overwhelmingly use 
Russian as main language of communication. 
The remainder uses Ukrainian, Gagauz and 
Bulgarian, although they are likely to use 
Russian as language of inter-ethnic 
communication, as will be seen below. This 
creates two largely separate linguistic spheres. 
Behind the linguistic divide are two principal 
factors: first, an uncertain Moldovan national 
identity,
6
 which inter alia causes the state 
language to lack the prestige and full acceptance 
as the sole official language of Moldova; and the 
fact that Russian, the dominant language during 
the Soviet period, enjoys a residual prestige, 
which however does not mean that its speakers 
do not feel menaced by their language’s loss of 
its official status in 1989.  
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The dilemma of Moldovan identity is 
best exemplified by a lack of consensus even as 
to the name of the state language – referred to 
either as ‘Romanian’ or ‘Moldovan’. This 
largely reflects Moldova’s position between 
Romania and Russia, which have both laid 
claims on the territory of Moldova.
7
 Thus, 
Moldova has been subjected to waves of 
Russification/Sovietization and Romanization.
8
 
Among the Soviet measures adopted in the 
Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic (MSSR, 
1940-1990) was the forging of a Moldovan 
identity as separate from the Romanian one.
9
 
The Soviet official discourse treated ‘Moldovan’ 
as a separate language from Romanian.
10
 
Although the issue of a possible separate 
Moldovan language is still contested,
11
 it has 
been argued that ‘Moldovan’ is merely a form of 
diglossia, and that the Moldovan language is 
virtually indistinguishable from Romanian.
12 
The 
only discernible difference during the Soviet 
period was the alphabet – Cyrillic in the case of 
‘Moldovan’, Latin for Romanian.13 Thus, 
Moldova does not have a unique linguistic 
identity that can differentiate it from other 
(nation-) states.  
The events since 1989, and the 
subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union,
14
 have 
intensified the split, and even led to a part the 
country, Transnistria, breaking away from 
Moldova. The liberalization of glasnost and 
perestroika enabled the formation of the 
Democratic Movement of Moldova in the 1980s, 
which developed into the nationalist Popular 
Front of Moldova (hereinafter Popular Front) in 
1989. Ethnic mobilization, including mass 
demonstrations organized by the Popular Front, 
led to the adoption by the Moldovan Supreme 
Soviet of new legislation, which proclaimed 
‘Moldovan’,15 written in the Latin script,16 the 
state language: the Law on the Status of the 
State Language
17
 and the Law on the 
Functioning of the Languages Spoken in the 
Territory of the Republic of Moldova 
(hereinafter the ‘Language Law’18). The new 
legislation was a sign of emancipation from the 
Russian language: by rejecting the Cyrillic 
alphabet, King contends, Moldovans rejected 
‘the key feature that had long distinguished them 
from Romanians’.19  
Ethnic mobilization was accompanied 
by calls for reunification with Romania, which 
led to fears among the Russian-speakers east of 
the river Dniestr/Nistru (Transnistria). Following 
fighting in 1991-92, in which the Transnistrians 
were supported by Russian forces, Transnistria 
declared independence. In addition to polarizing 
the population,
20
 the declaration of independence 
created a de facto separate state, which 
negotiations have been unable to resolve, 
resulting in a conflict that remains ‘frozen’. 
While in Moldova (minus Transnistria) the state 
language, as recognised in the Constitution, is 
Moldovan, east of the river the Russian language 
predominates.
21 
 
This historical background has led to 
two main outcomes: the politicization of 
language; and the crystallization of two virtually 
exclusive forms of language-based identities. 
II. LANGUAGE POLITICS 
Language issues have been taken up by 
Moldovan politicians. Strong ethnic 
mobilization in the late 80s and early 90s saw 
moves towards the Romanization of Moldova, 
championed by the Popular Front. With changes 
of government, linguistic priorities have shifted 
but continued to be in the background of 
political battles. Four phases can be 
distinguished: 1) ethnic mobilization, with a 
reaction to Sovietization and the Russian 
language, and with the ultimate objective of 
reunification with Romania (1989-1994); 2) a 
more moderate pro-Romanian line and the 
setting aside of plans of reunification, following 
the 1994 elections, when the Popular Front 
became a minority;
22
 3) the Communist 
government (2001-2009), and the stabilization 
of the volatile party scene in the decade 
following the Soviet Union’s collapse;23 4) the 
post-Communist phase (2009 to present), 
characterized by political instability and a 
deadlock in the appointment of a president 
(between September 2009 and March 2012). 
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Ethnic minority parties have been unable to 
enter parliament
24
 - thus, minority interests have 
been primarily represented by the mainstream 
parties. Given the (linguistic) Russification of 
the main minority groups, ethnic entrepreneurs 
could capitalize on the political objective of the 
introduction of Russian as a second state 
language;
25
 this appealed not only to ethnic 
Russians but other minorities as well, given their 
frequent lack of fluency in Romanian/Moldovan. 
Thus, the mainstream parties appropriated the 
ethnic entrepreneurs’ political slogans, while at 
the same time these parties offered a springboard 
for representatives of minorities to rise to 
prominence.
26
  
Under the Communist Party leadership 
(2001-2009) there were attempts by former 
Moldovan President Vladimir Voronin and 
Communist MPs to legislate so as to make 
Russian an official language alongside 
Moldovan, as well as to reintroduce Russian as a 
compulsory subject in all schools.
27
 The 
opposition strongly resisted these attempts. 
Following the change of government in 2009 
there has been a greater emphasis on the 
promotion of the state language, referred to 
primarily as ‘Romanian’ rather than 
‘Moldovan’.28 Indeed, while the Communists 
have tended to refer to the state language as 
‘Moldovan’, nationalists and unionists (those 
who sought unification with Romania) have 
referred to it as ‘Romanian’. These contrasting 
positions have been referred to as 
‘Moldovanism’ and ‘Romanism’, revealing a 
bifurcation of majority nationalism by which the 
first position is ‘state-seeking’ and the second 
aiming at unification.
29
  
Politicians have tended to embrace one 
or the other position, sometimes shifting 
between them. In the 1990s there were calls in 
the parliament to ban the name ‘Romanian’ for 
the state language altogether.
30
 Former President 
(1990-1997) Mircea Snegur went from a strong 
pro-Moldovanist position to a more moderate 
one, which has been linked to electoral 
maneuvering in the period prior to the 1996 
presidential elections.
31
 On 31 August 2012, on 
national Language Day, Dorin Chirtoacă, mayor 
or Chisinau and Liberal Party MP (in the ruling 
coalition), stated that it was only ‘a matter of 
time’ before ‘Romanian’ would be used in the 
Constitution.
32
 Yet, in September 2012 Marian 
Lupu
33
 surprised the rest of the ruling Alliance 
for European Integration when he stated that he 
had ‘changed his mind’ and that Moldovans 
spoke ‘Moldovan’, not ‘Romanian’, as he had 
asserted in the past.
34
 Perhaps surprisingly, the 
results of a 2012 public opinion poll by the 
Institute for Public Policy reveal that 65% of the 
respondents believed that the name of the state 
language should be ‘Moldovan’, and only 22.7% 
Romanian.
35
 
III. SOVIET LEGACIES 
Part of the explanation for the linguistic divide 
in contemporary Moldovan society can be traced 
back to Soviet policies, and particularly the 
institutionalization of ethnicity. The concept of 
‘nationality’ occupied a special place in Soviet 
societal (and territorial) arrangements. It 
originated from an acute need for diversity 
management, given the multitude of ethnic and 
linguistic groups, with varying forms of loyalties 
and belongings, present in the Soviet Union. The 
Soviets thus sought to devise methods to 
manage the country’s pluralism, including 
through what has been defined ‘ethnic 
federalism’.36  
Although the Soviet doctrines did not 
see ethnic groups as immutable and fixed, but 
able to evolve, these groups also had an essence, 
found in specific traits. These primordial 
characteristics would develop, and evolve, under 
Soviet guidance.
37
 This concept came to be seen 
as the groups’ ‘coming together’ (sblizhenie): 
while maintaining some internal traits, groups 
would progress towards the creation of the 
Soviet narod. Soviet policies saw the ‘coming 
together’ through the creation of the (supra-
national) homo sovieticus, which would mark 
the transcendence of difference, flattened out by 
communism.
38
  
 The overcoming of difference was, 
however, a long-term (and highly ambitious if 
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unethical) goal. The existing diversity required 
immediate attention, and mechanisms to manage 
it. As language was considered a salient ethnic 
marker in the Soviet Union, the state established 
schools in minority languages.
39
 The local 
administration was transferred to local leaders 
through the process of ‘indigenization’ 
(korenizatsiya). Local leaders filled positions in 
the local administration, the local Communist 
party, the judiciary and industry, through 
processes that included quota systems. One’s 
nationality was reinforced through the census 
takers, and in its being specified in internal 
Soviet passports and all documents, obliging 
people to continue to restate their nationality.
40 
 
To Brubaker, this amounted to ‘codif[ying] 
nationhood and nationality as fundamental social 
categories sharply distinct from statehood and 
citizenship.’41 By crystallizing, through its 
institutionalization, individual ethnocultural 
nationalities, the result was ‘institutionalized 
multinationality’.42 It did not result in a ‘melting 
pot’, but in an agglomeration of ethnic units - or 
‘an exhaustive and mutually exclusive set of 
national groups’.43 The affirmative action 
measures further contributed to an artificial 
division between ‘us and them’.44  
This emphasis on nationality did not 
leave much space for the development of a civic 
consciousness.
45
 Thus, it has been argued that, in 
the Soviet Union, like in imperial Russia, there 
were no narratives around the concepts of ‘civil 
society’ or ‘civic nationalism’. Rather, 
nationalism had been equated with ethnic 
nationalism.
46
   
IV. POST-SOVIET LINGUISTIC 
DIVISIONS AND THE 
LANGUAGE CHARTER 
Where does this leave Moldova at the end of the 
MSSR? Tolz rightly argues that Russia, and 
other former Soviet republics such as Moldova, 
have been faced with the need to create a post-
Soviet state from what was once a Union 
republic. It involves the difficult task of 
reconciling ‘the dominant nationality and ethnic 
minorities of their civic identities, based on 
inclusive citizenship, and their exclusive ethnic 
identities, based on shared culture, religion, 
language, and common ancestry’ [emphasis 
added].
47
 This process involves forging an 
overarching civic identity, while at the same 
time enabling various ethnic groups to 
rediscover their own cultures, languages and/or 
religions that might have been marginalised (in 
some cases repressed) during the Soviet period. 
This combination of civic and ethnic attributes 
would replace the vacuum left by ‘Soviet values’ 
further to the Union’s collapse.  
Two problems are linked to this. The 
first is that, as noted, the post-Soviet world has 
hardly a tradition of civic nationalism. The 
second relates to the difficulties in shaping a 
post-Soviet identity: it required a process of de-
Sovietization, by which peoples of newly-
independent states have tended to reach for 
elements of their pre-Soviet past. In the case of 
Moldova, this pre-Soviet past has been linked to 
the Romanian one, and has led some Romanian-
speakers to seek reunification, or closer links, 
with Romania. These attempts can fuel 
antagonism between the two main language 
groups, as they tend to marginalize Russian-
speakers.   
Census data cited above show that 
approximately three quarters of the population 
predominantly use Romanian/Moldovan rather 
than Russian (or other languages). However, in 
the MSSR Russian had become the language of 
the urban intelligentsia, higher in prestige than 
Romanian/Moldovan – although formally 
Russian and Moldovan enjoyed equal status as 
official languages. In the MSSR Russian was the 
language used by the government, in higher 
education as well as being the language inter-
ethnic communication. Since independence 
Moldova has struggled to reverse these 
dynamics, and to upgrade Romanian to a 
widely-recognised state language (limba de 
stat). The status of Romanian/Moldovan has 
been enhanced since independence but old 
perceptions persist – sustaining views of Russian 
as the language of education, business and, 
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generally, power.
48
 Russian continues to 
dominate certain areas of social life in Moldova, 
being the language of choice of a sizeable part of 
the business community (one should also note 
Moldova’s economic links with Russia). Efforts 
to promote the state language have varied over 
the years, although in the 21 years of 
independence of the Republic of Moldova, there 
have been no major changes in language 
legislation. The polarization of the two camps 
has prevented a unitary, comprehensive and 
effective language policy. The differences in 
approaches between the Communists and 
nationalists have already been noted; the 
former’s efforts concentrated in particular on the 
recognition of Russian as an official language 
alongside Moldovan. In addition, the 1989 
Language Law required civil servants to know 
both the state language and Russian by 1994. 
While Romanian-speakers tended to be already 
bilingual, many Russian-speakers have failed to 
become so, referring to various difficulties, 
including the absence of favourable conditions 
to acquire new language skills (such as 
inadequate textbooks).
49
   
With these linguistic issues in the 
background, Moldova has had to confront the 
issue of ratification of the Language Charter. 
The Moldovan authorities stated in 2009
50
 that 
the Language Charter was ‘in preparation of 
ratification’ by the authorities, in cooperation 
with civil society and minority organizations. It 
had previously already been included in the plan 
of action in human rights for 2004-2008 adopted 
by the Moldovan Parliament in 2004.
51
 The 
process had still not been completed in 2013.  
The reasons are likely to be linked to the 
sensitivity of language issues in Moldova. In 
particular, both language groups have noted a 
lack of ‘respect’ from the other side. Indeed, 
ethnographic research by Ciscel points to 
frustration among the Romanian-speaking 
population, as the state language is still not 
spoken by much of Moldova’s population - 
while at the same time Russian-speakers 
perceive their language as being downgraded 
and devalued.
52
 To this primary divide one has 
to add the divisions between the perceptions of 
state language (Moldovan or Romanian), adding 
another layer of complexity and delaying the 
forging a common (Moldovan) identity that can 
transcend linguistic fragmentation. 
The case of Moldova can be contrasted 
to that of Latvia. Latvia has developed much 
more far-reaching (arguably aggressive) policies 
than Moldova in promoting Latvian as the state 
language, with periodic examinations to certify 
its knowledge, on which employment often 
depends; the intensity of Latvian language 
promotion has also led to cases of 
discrimination.
53
 In comparison, the promotion 
of the state language is limited in scope in 
Moldova. However, language policies in Latvia 
and Moldova, although different, seem to be 
grounded on the dynamics of inclusion or 
exclusion in relation to ethnic (language) groups. 
In Latvia nationalism is closely connected to the 
Latvian language. The predominance of 
language in defining group cohesion is likely to 
impair an overarching identification for all 
peoples in Latvia, for example based on 
common history. The more moderate line of 
Moldova to Latvia might be linked more to 
practical, rather than ideological, reasons: the 
economic dependence on Russia, and Russia’s 
de facto control over Transnistria.
54
   
While Moldova has still not ratified the 
Language Charter, it is bound to protect the 
rights of persons belonging to national 
minorities through the FCNM. Data regarding 
the rights of national minorities in relation to 
their languages are outlined in the reports of the 
Moldovan government to the Advisory 
Committee on the Framework Convention for 
the Protection of National Minorities (ACFC), 
and the ACFC’s Opinions on Moldova’s 
performance in FCNM implementation.
55
 The 
ACFC noted shortcomings in the teaching of the 
state language to minorities (including 
Russians), with reference to, among other things, 
the limited resources allocated to it.
56
 Problems 
include the lack of qualified, bilingual teachers, 
teaching materials, as well as limited incentives 
and opportunities to learn the language in 
regions where persons belonging to minorities 
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are concentrated.
57
 While there appears to be an 
increasing openness to the learning of the state 
language, particularly among young people,
58
 
the ACFC noted the lack of ‘a comprehensive 
strategy and action plan for linguistic integration 
of persons belonging to national minorities who 
do not have an adequate command of the State 
language’.59 
The ACFC has further advanced the 
view that Moldovan society has remained 
divided along language lines, as the country 
searched for a national and state identity,
60
 and 
that ‘linguistic divisions are used for political 
purposes.’61 Indeed, there might have been cases 
of political manipulation, where parties seek to 
exploit language and identity issues to gain 
supporters, by fuelling grievances. This might 
have been the case in confrontations in the 
summer of 2012 in Bălți, in the North of 
Moldova, where Russian-speakers are 
concentrated. During a ‘Union March’ 
(promoting unification with Romanian), a group 
of (anti-unionist) statists, primarily Russian-
speakers, resorted to violence against the police 
that had been summoned to protect the 
marchers.
62
 There have also been tensions, albeit 
non-violent, around the 2011 results of 
secondary school examinations in Gagauzia, 
when persons belonging to the Gagauz minority, 
who had studied in Russian schools, failed to 
pass the Romanian-language test and were not 
issued diplomas.
63
 The local authorities 
proceeded to issue their own diplomas, defying 
the central authorities – an act that was declared 
illegal by the Ministry of Education.
64
 In another 
case, Vladimir Mişin, an ex-Communist Party 
member, declared in 2012 that he wished to 
create a party primarily for the representation of 
Russian-speakers.
65
 
Some persons belonging to Moldova’s 
national minorities remain in the Russian-
speaking camp. One of the reasons why this 
occurs is that the teaching of minority languages 
is provided only in schools with Russian as main 
language of instruction.
66
 As a consequence, 
persons belonging to national minorities study 
the state language as third language,
67
 which 
frequently results in lack of fluency. The ACFC 
has argued that such an educational system can 
increase the tendency of some persons belonging 
to national minorities to identify more with the 
Russian-speaking group rather than their own 
minority group. Indeed, in some areas, such as 
regions with high concentrations of Ukrainians, 
most of the teaching takes place in Russian.
68
 As 
in the Soviet period, minorities continue to use 
Russian as the language of inter-ethnic 
communication. It reinforces the strong 
polarization between the two main language 
groups. 
An important aspect of the current 
conundrum in language policy is the ‘hybrid’ 
status of the Russian language in Moldova. 
While the Moldovan Constitution states that 
Moldovan, in the Latin script, is the state 
language, it also stipulates that ‘the State shall 
recognize and protect the right to the 
preservation, development and functioning of 
Russian and of other languages spoken in the 
territory of the country’. As noted, Russian is 
defined in Article 3 of the Language Law as 
‘language of inter-ethnic communication’. 
Therefore, it seems to be placed in a third 
category between those of ‘official’ and 
‘minority’ language.69 Another example is 
provided by the Law on the Rights of Persons 
belonging to National Minorities and the Legal 
Status of their Organizations of 12 July 2001. 
Article 6(1) reads: 
The State shall guarantee the fulfilment 
of the rights of persons belonging to 
national minorities to pre-school 
education, primary education, secondary 
education (general and vocational), 
higher and postgraduate education in 
Moldovan and Russian, and shall create 
the conditions for fulfilling their right to 
education and instruction in the mother 
tongue (Ukrainian, Gagauz, Bulgarian, 
Hebrew, Yiddish, etc.) [italics added].
70
 
Here minority languages are treated separately 
from Russian, which instead is referred to in the 
article together with the state language. The 
 ECMI- Working Paper 
 
 
9 | P a g e  
 
ratification of the Language Charter would 
unequivocally place Russian among Moldova’s 
‘minority languages’, suggesting a drop in status 
compared to its current recognition as ‘language 
of inter-ethnic communication’. Additionally, 
traditional Soviet expressions to designate ethnic 
groups did not include ‘minority’71 but rather 
‘nation’ and ‘nationality’ (natsiya, 
natsional’nost’) and ‘ethnos’ (etnos, 
etnonarod).
72
  
V. CONCLUSION 
Moldova is confronted by the fact that 
Romanian/Moldovan is not a fully-functioning 
state language, and is in need of wide-ranging 
measures for its promotion. Many Moldovan 
citizens have no or poor knowledge of it, while 
the language also suffers from a residual post-
Soviet perception of its ‘inferiority’ to Russian. 
At the same time, Russian has not become 
official alongside Romanian/Moldovan, despite 
efforts to this effect by the Communists. The 
two camps have acted to block each other’s 
initiatives and remained antagonistic, with 
mutually exclusive approaches. Although mixed 
families do exist, and some Moldovan citizens 
may identify with both groups, overall a sharp 
antagonism predominates. The primary 
identification with one of the two language 
groups might impair the development of a civic 
form of nationalism in the shape of an 
overarching Moldovan consciousness.  
 To the exclusivity of identity 
(Romanian- or Russian-speaker) one has to add 
the attitudes and wishes of Russian-speakers in 
Moldova. Russian-speakers call for the ‘respect’ 
of their language
73
 – for example through 
Russian being recognized as a state language 
alongside the Moldovan/Romanian. These 
frictions reinforce the language divide, which 
the ratification of the Language Charter may 
make more acute. Indeed, ratification would 
unambiguously classify Russian as a ‘minority 
language’ – an expression that does not convey 
the same prestige of the Soviet-era ‘language of 
inter-ethnic communication’. There is perhaps 
an argument for an integration strategy that 
places a stronger emphasis on ‘common history, 
traditions, and a shared society’,74 diverting 
attention from, and desensitizing, the issue of 
language. This might ultimately lead to the end 
of the tug of war between the Moldova’s two 
main language groups.
75
 Additionally, efforts 
may be placed on the creation of a (post-Soviet) 
civic consciousness that allows for non-
exclusionary approaches to ethnicity and 
language. Until one moves away from the 
‘institutionalization of ethnicity’, attributes of 
cultural, ethnic and linguistic identity will 
continue to be placed antagonistically to each 
other, rather than being perceived as potentially 
compatible and multi-layered. 
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the Politics of Culture. Stanford, CA, Hoover Institution Press. 
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 Bessarabia (the part of current Moldova west of the river Dniestr/Nistru) was unified with Romania in 1918, after 
being part of the Russian Empire. It was annexed by the Soviet Union in 1940. The part of Moldova East of the 
river, instead, became part of the USSR in 1924 as the ‘Moldovan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic’ 
(MASSR), a region inside Soviet Ukraine.  
8
 King, op. cit. note 6. 
9
 On Soviet ‘Moldovanization’, see King (ibid). 
10
 On Moldovan identity as a construct, see Win van Meurs 1998. “Carving a Moldovan Identity out of History”. 
Nationalities Papers, 26(1), 39-56. 
11
 The issue of a Moldovan identity, separate from the Romanian one, has also been subject of debate. This approach 
has been supported by Moldovan nationalists in reaction to the pan-Romanians. In 1994, (then) President Mircea 
Snegur asked historians and linguists to study Moldovan independent identity. King, op. cit. note 6, at  4. 
12
 Ciscel (2006), op. cit. note 6. 
13
 Ibid. 
14
 Moldova became an independent state in 1991. 
15
 In the legislation the expression used is ‘Moldovan’ (or ‘the state language’), rather than ‘Romanian’. 
16
 Over the years the issue of the Latin versus the Cyrillic alphabet has also caused tensions between Chisinau and 
the breakaway region of Transnistria. 
17
 No. 3464-XI of 31 August 1989.  
18
 No. 3465-XI of 1 September 1989. Although these laws were originally adopted as laws of the MSSR, they 
remain in force after Moldova’s independence, insofar as they do not contradict the 1994 Constitution of Moldova. 
The Constitution stipulates at Article 13 that ‘[t]he State language of the Republic of Moldova shall be Moldovan, 
using the Latin script.’  
19
 King, op. cit. note 6, at 3. 
20
 Ibid, at 4. 
21
 Even through the legislation of the breakaway region recognizes not only Russian as official language of 
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